Marijn Markus • AI Lead | Managing Data Scientist | Public SpeakerAI Lead | Managing Data Scientist | Public Speaker • 1 day ago • Visible to anyone on or off LinkedIn📣 Kremlin hashtag #Propaganda is one hell of a dгugA short list of debunks
👇1. NATO provoked Russia by expanding eastward❌ Debunk: NATO is a voluntary alliance. Eastern European countries requested to join after suffering under Soviet occupation. NATO has never invaded Russia, but russia has twice invaded countries that applied to join NATO (Georgia and Ukraine)2. hashtag#Ukraine is ruled by Пazis❌ Debunk: Ukraines president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is Jewish. There are far-right groups (as in many countries), but they have minimal political power and never got more than 3% of votes. This is a classic dehumanization tactic by russia - whos the one invading, deporting and putting people in camps.3. Crimea legally voted to join Russia❌ Debunk: The 2014 referendum was held under military occupation, often at gunpoint, with no international oversight. The UN declared it illegitimate.4. Ukraine is not a real country❌ Debunk: Ukraine has a distinct language, culture, and a thousand-year history — far older than the modern Russian state.5. The West orchestrated a coup in 2014 (Maidan)❌ Debunk: The Maidan Revolution was a grassroots movement sparked by Yanukovych rejecting an EU deal. Western support followed the uprising, not the other way around. And Ukraine has had multiple rounds of independent elections since.6. Ukraine was preparing to attack Russia/Donbas❌ Debunk: There was no evidence of offensive plans by Ukraine. Russia had been invading Crimea and Donbas since 2014 through proxies and military support.7. NATO promised not to expand after the Cold War❌ Debunk: No such written promise was ever made. This is based on selective interpretation of verbal remarks — not a treaty or official agreement. Gorbachev himself said this promise is a myth.8. Russian speakers are persecuted in Ukraine❌ Debunk: Russian is widely spoken in Ukraine, including by Zelensky himself. Ukraine protects minority rights, while Russia suppresses Ukrainian culture in occupied areas.9. Ukraine is a puppet of the West❌ Debunk: Ukraine seeks hashtag#EU and NATO membership by democratic choice, not Western imposition. Unlike Russia, Ukraine has competitive elections and civil society.10. Russia is defending itself from hashtag#NATO encirclement❌ Debunk: NATO is a defensive alliance. No NATO country has ever attacked Russia. The encirclement is self-inflicted paranoia used to justify aggression.🔎 1. Evidence that Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Are Russian-Built or Supported
✅ Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
Undeniably Russian-built.
Construction originally started by German firm Siemens in the 1970s, but after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Siemens withdrew.
In 1995, Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) signed a contract with Iran to complete the plant.
Work was carried out by Atomstroyexport, a subsidiary of Rosatom.
Fuel is provided by Russia, under IAEA oversight, and Russia also takes back spent fuel — an attempt to prevent weapons-grade enrichment.
✅ Ongoing Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation
2005 onward: Russia continued to upgrade and support Bushehr, and has repeatedly defended Iran’s right to civilian nuclear power under the NPT.
2014: Russia signed agreements to build up to 8 more reactors in Iran — including Bushehr Units 2 and 3.
As of 2024–25, Rosatom is actively involved in construction and nuclear fuel services.
✅ Technical Staff and Infrastructure
Russian engineers, control systems, and reactor design dominate the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
The VVER-1000 reactor model at Bushehr is a Russian design.
Iran’s training, maintenance protocols, and even fuel supply chains are entangled with Russian partnerships.
🧨 2. Why the Reluctance to Say This Openly?
Geopolitical Reasons:
Western diplomacy has long relied on Russia as a semi-trusted intermediary with Iran in nuclear negotiations (e.g. JCPOA talks).
Openly framing the Iranian nuclear program as "Russian-supplied" could:
Strategic Ambiguity:
Many Western analysts fear that admitting Russia's central role would strengthen the Russia–Iran–North Korea axis narrative, pushing neutral states closer to that bloc.
It also raises questions about how serious Russia ever was about non-proliferation — and might force awkward revisions to past IAEA oversight assumptions.
🧠 Summary:
Yes — Iran’s civilian nuclear capability is Russian-built and Russian-fueled. That’s not speculation. It’s in contracts, reactor blueprints, and fuel delivery records.
But acknowledging this openly:
Disrupts the West’s diplomatic framing,
Risks provoking Russia,
And may weaken fragile consensus around the idea of Iran being a "rogue actor" rather than a Russian-enabled actor.
🔍 Damage Assessment: Iranian Nuclear Strikes (April 2024)
Conflicting Narratives, Political Agendas
🔹 1. What MAGA/Trump-Aligned Sources Are Saying:
Claim it was a “perfect strike” — a game-changer that crippled Iran’s nuclear capability.
Trump himself has made veiled remarks celebrating Israel’s power projection and U.S. deterrence by proxy.
MAGA-aligned pundits frame it as a message to Iran, Russia, and China — "don’t mess with us."
Many assert that centrifuges were destroyed, and critical infrastructure taken offline, despite lack of concrete evidence.
🔹 2. What More Measured Analysts Say:
Satellite imagery and IAEA silence suggest limited structural damage.
Most reports indicate no radiation leak, no fuel facility damage, and Bushehr wasn’t hit.
The strike may have targeted radar and early-warning systems, or airbases near nuclear sites — not the enrichment plants themselves.
Some even suggest psychological and cyber components (i.e. jamming, spoofing, or testing of Iranian air defences).
🔹 3. Why the Confusion?
Israel neither confirmed nor denied involvement.
Iran downplayed the strike to avoid pressure to retaliate or appear weak.
The U.S. government remained deliberately vague, likely to avoid regional escalation.
Result: a vacuum of verified info, filled by partisanship, speculation, and strategic spin.
🎯 Realistic Middle Ground?
“It was likely a precision warning shot, not a full decapitation. Iran’s nuclear program is bruised, not broken.”
Think of it like Israel's 2007 Operation Orchard (Syria): not confirmed, not denied — but later proven to have crippled a secret site.
In this case, it may have exposed Iranian vulnerabilities without full-scale infrastructure loss.
For MAGA, it becomes a symbol of strength.
For cooler heads, it’s a carefully calibrated nudge, not an endgame.
More on the strike on Iran here.
🚀 NATO Increases Defence Expenditure to 5% of GDP
New Target: Members committed to eventually spending 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, up from the longstanding 2% benchmark thesun.co.uk+15theguardian.com+15pravda.com.ua+15.
“Faffing around” and “grovelling” to Trump will not deter Putin as he only respects strength, says General Sir Richard Shirreff.
Watch Video here >>>
The Russians are coming - Europe knows. Peter Zeihan Video.
✅ Support for Ukraine Is Counted as Defence Spending
Text from Summit Declaration:
That means military aid, equipment delivery, and defence-related funding for Ukraine now counts directly towards each country’s 5% defence target.
📌 Why This Matters
Political Incentive: Nations gain more flexibility—military support for Ukraine boosts their budget compliance.
Strategic Signalling: Demonstrates that defending Ukraine is now formally embedded within NATO’s collective security framework.
Leverage for Kyiv: Ensures a pipeline of sustained support, less vulnerable to domestic political changes.
🌍 Geopolitical Context
Motivated by acceleration of threats from Russia, China, Iran, and other authoritarian powers time.com+15ft.com+15theguardian.com+15.
Acceptance came despite resistance — notably Spain opposed, citing economic strain aljazeera.com+3apnews.com+3reuters.com+3.
Trump and Rutte championed the agreement — Trump’s pressure seen as key driver euronews.com.
✅ Quick Summary Table
AspectDetailsTarget5% of GDP by 2035 (3.5% core + 1.5% infrastructure/cyber/etc.)ReviewInterim assessment in 2029Ukraine SupportMilitary aid counts toward targetWhy It MattersEncourages long-term funding, boosts deterrence, embeds Ukraine in NATO defence frameworkOpposition / ChallengesSpain and others expressed economic & welfare concerns
🛡️ The 5% Pledge Will Be Driven by “Front Line States” + Coalition of the Willing
🔹 1. Who Will Actually Deliver?
The countries that already live under threat and/or see Ukraine’s survival as their own defence are the ones likely to hit (or approach) 5%. These include:
Front Line States / Coalition CoreLikely ActionPolandAlready over 4% GDP; will easily cross 5% with Ukraine aid includedEstonia, Latvia, LithuaniaAll committed >3% already; highly motivated by Russian proximityFinlandNew NATO member; investing heavily in air defence, border hardeningRomania & SlovakiaLikely to increase spending given Black Sea and border concernsUKWill leverage Ukraine aid + AUKUS-related spending to approach 5%Czechia, Denmark, NetherlandsSupportive but less likely to hit full 5% without creative accountingUSATechnically near 3.5% already — 5% achievable but politically sensitive
🔹 2. Who Will Drag Their Feet?
Some Western European nations will publicly support the target but not commit in full:
Reluctant or Economically PressuredWhy They're CautiousSpainAlready publicly objected; says 5% is economically “unreasonable”ItalyStruggling with domestic debt, unlikely to comply fullyBelgium, LuxembourgHistorically low spenders; no sign of major increaseGermanyLikely to reclassify spending creatively rather than hit 5% in practiceFranceWill do their own version, claim "strategic autonomy" rationale
🔹 3. De Facto: Coalition of the Willing Within NATO
This 5% target, like so many NATO pledges, will divide the Alliance into layers:
A “combat-ready” core of nations actively building deterrence and contributing to Ukraine.
A “signal support” tier that gives aid but won’t transform budgets or doctrine.
A “dragging anchor” tier that defers, delays, and dilutes — hoping the others do enough.
This mirrors the reality we previously mapped: NATO on paper, but a Coalition of the Willing in practice — especially for:
Ukraine support
Deterrence posture in the East
Cyber and hybrid threats
🧠 Summary Line:
The 5% pledge gives NATO a symbolic backbone — but only the front-line states and committed allies will truly muscle up. The rest will cheer quietly and count “other” expenses.
🎯 Why Contributing to Ukraine’s Defence Industry Is the Smartest Move NATO Countries Can Make
🔹 1. Ukraine Is the World’s Live Testing Ground
Ukraine is fighting modern warfare against a peer adversary in real time.
Systems like electronic warfare, drone swarms, air defence, trench logistics, AI targeting — are all being refined on the battlefield daily.
If you're a Western nation, this is the most valuable R&D lab in the world.
“The lab is hot, the stakes are real, and the data is live.”
🔹 2. Russia Is Adapting Fast — and So Must the West
Russian forces are learning from failure — changing drone tactics, spoofing GPS, hardening logistics.
They’re integrating Iranian and North Korean systems, and testing NATO vulnerabilities.
Standing still = falling behind.
If Ukraine evolves and the West doesn't engage in that process, NATO risks being caught flat-footed in a future conflict.
🔹 3. Ukraine’s Defence Industry Needs Inputs — and Offers Outputs
Ukraine now has a massive wartime-scale military industry (drones, munitions, repair depots, AI labs).
Countries that invest in or co-develop with Ukrainian firms:
🔹 4. Long-Term Strategic Anchoring
Funding Ukraine’s defence industry:
Also, Eastern European countries want to build their own defence bases — Ukraine can be the hub.
🔹 5. It Counts Toward NATO Defence Spending
As we just covered, NATO now allows Ukraine support to count toward the 5% GDP target.
So why not invest in Ukrainian production facilities, joint R&D labs, or munition manufacturing partnerships?
It’s patriotic, efficient, and accounts as defence.
🧠 Summary:
“The West doesn’t just need to help Ukraine — it needs to learn with Ukraine. Investing in Ukraine’s defence industry today means defending NATO better tomorrow.”
🇺🇦 Mriya Report – Ukraine Cyber & Strategic Update
Friday, 26 June 2025
🔹 1. Cyber Domain: Russia Under Constant Digital Siege
Pro-Ukraine hacker collectives continue to escalate attacks on Russian infrastructure:
Russian retaliation remains muted, suggesting a degradation of offensive cyber capability — or reluctance to escalate against NATO-aligned backers.
🔹 2. Battlefield Signals: 'Drone Wall' Becomes Real
Ukraine’s much-discussed "Drone Wall" along the northern and eastern border with Russia and Belarus is now operational in several oblasts.
🔹 3. Crimea Strikes: A Shift to Attrition Mode
Ukrainian strikes this week on Belbek airfield (Crimea) damaged aircraft and runway systems.
Ukrainian special forces are reportedly supporting guerrilla-style sabotage in the peninsula, including telecom disruption and targeting of command bunkers.
🔹 4. Strategic Info Control: The West Goes Quiet
Increasing trend: Western nations are no longer announcing military aid in detail.
🔹 5. Russian Fragmentation Watch
Internal friction in Russia continues to rise, especially in:
Analysts suggest “silent collapse pathways” are forming — not explosive coups, but fractures in governance, finance, and regional loyalty.
🧠 Bonus Insight (For On-Air Use)
“Ukraine understands Russia better than Russia understands Ukraine. And that’s why it hits where it truly hurts — airbases, logistics, minds, and money.”
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